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The Kerala Regime and Regional Disparities in
Health Infrastructure Versus Outcomes
SURAJ JACOB
Kerala’s development trajectory has attracted considerable attention because of the
state’s human development achievements.1 A 1975 report issued under the aegis of the
United Nations underlined these achievements, and a 1985 report by the Rockefeller
Foundation singled out Kerala’s health achievements from a global perspective.2 The
literature holds that a key aspect of the “Kerala model” was the reduction of inter-
regional disparities in development infrastructure and outcomes between relatively
backward Malabar in the north and relatively developed Travancore-Cochin in the
south.3 Furthermore, the reduction of regional disparity in human development out-
comes is typically attributed to reduction in regional disparity in development infras-
tructure put in place by Kerala’s social democratic policy regime from 1957 onward.
V. K. Ramachandran summarized the conventional wisdom about this thusly:4
A highlight of Kerala’s development experience is that public action after
1957 helped close the gap in important respects between Malabar and the southern
districts of Kerala. The disparities in health and education facilities in Travancore
andMalabar have been usefully discussed in Kabir and Krishnan (1992).5 In respect
of literacy, it is clear that the literacy gap between Malabar and the princely states
widened substantially during the period that Malabar was part of British India, and
it narrowed only after mass schooling was established in Malabar after 1957. The
reduction of differences between the north and south in respect of literacy, medical
facilities, infant mortality, immunization, and fertility and death rates, and in infras-
tructural and general cultural development is a standing example of the achievement
of people and governments in recent decades.
The present study revisits the argument of reduced regional disparities attributed
to Kerala’s social democratic regime.6 Although the Kerala literature sometimes con-
flates development outcomes and infrastructure—as seen from the aforementioned
quotation—the distinction is important both from a conceptual and a policy-making
perspective. A seminal report by theWorld Health Organization distinguishes between
goal “attainment” (outcomes such as life expectancy) and “resource availability” (inputs
representing health infrastructure and services).7 Based on this distinction, I re-evaluate
the empirical evidence for regional development in Kerala. I find that while there
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was indeed a reduction in regional disparity in development outcomes, there was no
corresponding reduction of disparity in development infrastructure. Further, since the
conventional wisdom emphasizes the role of Kerala’s vaunted regime in infrastructure
disparity reduction, I reappraise the role of the regime on the basis of the finding that
infrastructure disparity did not reduce.
In the following section, I begin by revisiting evidence presented in key stud-
ies of the relative health trajectories of Travancore-Cochin and Malabar. I show that
the extant literature implicitly uses a ratio measure for disparity to show that infras-
tructure disparity reduced; for instance, the ratio of hospital beds (per capita) in
Travancore-Cochin and Malabar became closer to unity over time. However, infras-
tructure disparity did not reduce if the difference measure is used instead; for instance,
the raw difference between hospital beds (per capita) in the two regions did not reduce.
Over time, the ratio can become closer to unity even when the difference is constant or
increasing. I argue that from a welfare perspective the difference measure is more useful
in understanding the comparative development trajectories of the two regions. Indeed,
in the previous literature the intuition regarding regional development disparity is artic-
ulated in difference terms even though interpretation of the empirical evidence has been
implicitly in ratio terms.
After establishing that health infrastructure disparity did not reduce even though
health outcome disparity did reduce, I turn to two questions implied by this finding.
First, what explains this puzzle? If infrastructure is an important input in determining
outcomes, how is it possible that outcome disparity reduced without corresponding
reduction in infrastructure disparity? I argue that a potential, simple explanation lies
in the phenomenon of “diminishing returns.” That is, the “production function” for
health may be such that as infrastructure increases, additional infrastructure produces
smaller improvements in health outcomes. I briefly survey the global literature on
health production functions to show that this is indeed possible and likely. The exis-
tence of a diminishing returns production function would account for the puzzle of
constant infrastructure disparity yielding reduced outcome disparity. That is, such a
production function would imply that starting at different levels of both health infras-
tructure and outcomes, as both regions underwent similar increases in infrastructure the
increase in infrastructure produced smaller improvement in outcomes in Travancore-
Cochin than in Malabar, thus reducing the disparity in outcomes. As paucity of data do
not currently allow for estimation of a health production function at different points in
time for the regions of Kerala, I am not arguing that the diminishing returns argument
definitively explains the puzzle. Instead, I simply advance the possibility, based on a
reading of the larger literature, both from developed and developing countries, that this
could explain the puzzle.
Second, does the Kerala regime factor hold explanatory value if in fact there was
no reduction in input disparity between Travancore-Cochin and Malabar? I argue that
it does, but not in the way envisaged by the Kerala literature on regional disparities.
The Kerala literature focuses on the regime’s ability to disproportionately favor the
lagging Malabar region. However, regional disparity in inputs—including disparity in
publicly provided goods—did not reduce. Instead, the argument advanced here is that
the potency of the regime lay in increasing development inputs throughout the state
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(albeit without favoring the lagging region), and consolidating the conditions for “pub-
lic action” to effectively demand and utilize these inputs, which ultimately resulted in
reduction in outcome disparity between the regions.
The Literature on Regional Disparities in Kerala
The literature on regional disparities in Kerala consistently states that there was a reduc-
tion in disparities in both development inputs and outcomes over time, and argues
that Kerala’s post-1956 welfare policy regime played a major role in this. Kerala’s
comprehensiveHuman Development Report notes:
At the time of Independence, there existed wide regional differences within Kerala,
in terms of the broad indicators of human development. . . . These differences nar-
rowed down in the subsequent period and within the next 30 years, Malabar caught
up with Travancore in terms not only of facilities for health care and education, but
also in health and educational outcomes . . . ”8
Similarly, T. N. Krishnan notes:
After the formation of the State, the government placed greater emphasis on the
expansion of health-care facilities in the Malabar region in order to reduce the
inequality in the availability of health care between the two regions. The reduction
in death rate and in infant mortality in the Malabar region must be partly attributed
to this factor.”9
The literature typically cites a study by M. Kabir and T. N. Krishnan regarding the tra-
jectory of regional disparities in Kerala.10 This study and related work by the authors,
particularly T. N. Krishnan, has been rightly seen as foundational in analyzing Kerala’s
development trajectory. Kabir–Krishnan explicitly focus on regional health disparities,
and in turn, they draw from, and expand, the data and the insights from another foun-
dational study published under the aegis of the United Nations.11 In the following
sections, I revisit the evidence provided by these studies.
The Kabir–Krishnan and United Nations Studies
The quantitative data presented byKabir–Krishnan pertain to four variables, two health
outcomes and two publicly-provided health infrastructure inputs. Figure 1 plots their
data for the two health outcomes (general mortality and infant mortality) and shows
a dramatic reduction in the outcome disparity in the two regions over time. Although
there are reasons to question the credibility of these specific outcome measures (see the
Appendix), other evidence also points to a similar qualitative result.12 Kabir–Krishnan
argue that the reduction in the outcome disparity was in large part due to a reduction
in the health infrastructure disparity.13 They use two infrastructure indicators to make
this argument, the number of hospital beds and patients treated (both normalized by
population) in government health facilities. Figure 2 graphs their data. Surprisingly,
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FIGURE 1
HEALTHOUTCOMES IN MALABAR AND TRAVANCORE (KABIR–KRISHNAN)
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Source: Kabir and Krishnan, “Social Intermediation.” General and infant mortality rates are calculated per 1000
population.
the regional difference in hospital beds or patients treated does not reduce in the post-
1956 period: while each indicator increased appreciably over time, the difference was
roughly constant after Kerala state formation.14 This pattern of data interpretation is
shared by another influential study, by P. G. K. Panikar and C. R. Soman. Referring
to government allopathic infrastructure, they write that “[t]he inter-regional differ-
ences . . . are seen to have gradually narrowed.”15 However, according to the data they
present for 1961–81, the difference between the two regions increased for three of their
indicators (per capita availability of government hospitals, primary health centers, and
beds in government allopathic facilities) and decreased only for one of their indicators
(per capita availability of government dispensaries).16 To my knowledge, the absence
of regional convergence for health inputs in Kerala has been pointed out by only one
previous work in the literature, by P. N. Mari Bhat and Irudaya Rajan.17 In their foot-
note 4, they observe that Malabar accounted for 22 percent and 30 percent of the state’s
hospital beds in 1959 and 1988, respectively, while it also accounted for 36 percent and
40 percent of population in these years. These numbers are consistent with those used
by Kabir–Krishnan and plotted in Figure 2.
Measures of Regional Disparity
Why did Kabir–Krishnan and Panikar-Soman conclude that their data suggest reduc-
tion in the health infrastructure disparity? It is likely that they were looking at
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FIGURE 2
HEALTH INPUTS IN MALABAR AND TRAVANCORE (KABIR–KRISHNAN)
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Source: Kabir and Krishnan, “Social Intermediation.” Left graph refers to government hospital beds per 100,000 popula-
tion and right graph refers to patients treated in allopathic government hospitals.
time trends in the ratio (YTravancore / YMalabar) rather than in the level difference
(YTravancore – YMalabar).18 Kabir–Krishnan draw from, and expand, the data and the
insights from the 1975 UN report, which explicitly uses the ratio measure to calculate
health infrastructure disparity: “[i]n 1956/57 the number of beds per 100,000 pop-
ulation was 2.4 times greater in Travancore-Cochin than in Malabar, but this ratio
reflecting the interregional difference declined to 1.5 in 1970/71.”19 However, when
discussing literacy, the same report employs the level difference: it notes that in
1961-71 there was substantial divergence between the literacy rates in Kerala and
India – the difference increased from five to thirteen percentage points.20 It turns
out that if the ratio measure were used instead, the divergence would be marginal
(from 1.96 to 2.06). Similarly, T. N. Krishnan compares the population/bed ratio in
Malabar and Travancore-Cochin in 1956–57 (3125 and 1282) and 1989–90 (1021 and
642) to show how “the differentials in health-care facilities between the two regions”
was reduced.21 In fact, these numbers show that the raw difference in bed avail-
ability increased (from 46 beds to 58 per 100,000 population), rather than reducing
substantially.
Figure 3 graphs the two measures of regional disparity, one based on level difference
and the other based on the ratio, for hospital beds and patients treated, using the Kabir–
Krishnan data. In the post-1956 period the level difference for hospital beds increased
but the ratio decreased. For patients treated in the post-1956 period, the level difference
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FIGURE 3
CONVERGENCEMEASURES FOR HOSPITAL BEDS AND PATIENTS TREATED (KABIR–KRISHNAN DATA)
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Source: Kabir and Krishnan, “Social Intermediation.”
decreased slightly while the ratio decreased substantially. The ratio fell because the level
difference stayed roughly constant in the face of rising absolute values (Figure 2).
The fact that the level difference measure yields a different interpretation of change
in disparity compared to the ratio measure casts attention on the question of the best
measure in this context. It turns out that the cross-national health literature also has
an analogous problem: there was convergence in infant and child mortality across the
world using a measure corresponding to the level difference, but divergence using a
measure corresponding to the ratio.22 Angus Deaton points out: 23
. . . the factual reason for the difference is that infant and child mortality rates
have continued to decline in the low mortality rich countries of the North and,
because the initial levels of mortality were so low, even small absolute reductions
are proportionately large. In Sweden, for example, infant mortality fell from 11 per
thousand in 1970 to 3.2 in 2000, while in Mali it fell from 225 to 124 per thousand.
The number of lives saved in Sweden is small relative to the number in Mali, but
the proportional decline is much larger. This is, of course, a general problem in the
literature on health inequalities, which tends to focus on ratios of mortality rates
which, in this case, show a worsening of health inequality between Sweden and
Mali, from a ratio of 20.5 to 38.8, in spite of the fact that many more Malian than
Swedish lives have been saved.
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Deaton’s argument indicates that from a welfare perspective what matters more is the
number of lives saved, for which the level difference is the more appropriate mea-
sure. The difference measure is also the standard measure used in much of the recent
empirical literature on development.24
Other Evidence on Regional Disparities in Health Inputs Versus Outcomes
In addition to the data on mortality rates (Figure 1) and hospital beds and patients
treated in government facilities (Figure 2), other data are also consistent with the notion
that there was considerable reduction in health outcome disparities without a corre-
sponding reduction in input disparities. In the following, I outline some additional
evidence.
Outcome Disparities
As discussed in the Appendix, it is difficult to construct high-quality region-wise
data on mortality rates for earlier decades. However, district-wise estimates by the
Population Foundation of India for 1991 and 2001 cast some light on regional dis-
parities in recent decades.25 Table 1 summarizes these estimates for Malabar and
Travancore-Cochin.26 For both infant and child mortality, Travancore-Cochin had
the lower rate in 1991, but by 2001 the difference reduced for both measures, and
in fact Malabar had the lower rate for infant mortality. This general trend also holds
for disparities across specific sub-populations in the two regions (women and men,
rural, and urban). These estimates are also consistent with estimates of life expectancy
from the Indian Institute of Population Studies.27 Aggregating district-wise estimates
for Malabar and Travancore-Cochin weighted by population, the life expectancy for
2001 was 73.41 and 72.58, respectively—very close, with Malabar having a slight
advantage.
TABLE 1
RECENTMORTALITY ESTIMATES
1981 1991
Item Travancore-Cochin Malabar Travancore-Cochin Malabar
IMR 34.45 37.22 17.73 16.82
IMR, males 30.25 38.93 16.08 15.40
IMR, females 38.00 32.63 19.98 18.87
IMR, rural 34.98 39.93 17.91 17.07
IMR, urban 32.50 29.76 17.72 17.12
CMR 41.21 52.16 18.73 20.17
CMR, males 38.89 52.00 17.08 19.17
CMR, females 45.15 53.04 21.15 21.35
CMR, rural 40.96 54.86 18.67 20.01
CMR, urban 38.69 45.63 17.89 19.89
Notes: Data from the Population Foundation of India, based on census data. IMR and CMR stand for infant and child
mortality, respectively. As the underlying estimates are for districts, IMR and CMR figures for regions (Malabar and
Travancore-Cochin) were calculated by averaging the district figures weighted by the number of births; the weights
were calculated from crude birth rate figures compiled by the Civil Registration System and presented in Administrative
Reports of the Health Department.
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TABLE 2
FERTILITY ESTIMATES USING CHILD-WOMAN RATIO
CWR1 CWR2
Census year Period TC M Dif.
(TC-M)
Ratio
(TC/M)
Period TC M Dif.
(TC-M)
Ratio
(TC/M)
1951 1946–51 590 501 89 1.18 1941–46 576 481 95 1.20
1961 1956–61 647 622 25 1.04 1951–56 722 657 65 1.10
1971 1966–71 526 591 −65 0.89 1961–66 656 682 −26 0.96
1981 1976–81 360 482 −122 0.75 1971–76 475 605 −130 0.79
1991 1986–91 293 384 −91 0.76 1981–86 423 599 −176 0.71
2001 1996–01 281 333 −52 0.84 1991–96 346 432 −86 0.80
Note: Data calculated by the Kerala Development Report from census reports. TC and M stand for Travancore-Cochin
and Malabar, respectively. CWR1 is the ratio of the number of children in the age-group 0–4 years to the number of
women in the age-group 15–49; it is an estimate of fertility in the five years immediately preceding a census. CWR2 is
the ratio of the number of children in the age-group 5–9 years to the number of women in the age-group 20–55; it is an
estimate of fertility in the five years before that.
Consider next the child-woman ratio (CWR). The CWR calculated from census
data is a commonly cited indicator of health outcomes in Kerala (in addition to mor-
tality rates). Furthermore, both intuition and the literature suggest that it is affected
by health infrastructure.28 With the decennial census as the main data source for pre-
vious decades, demographers use two CWR measures, which I refer to as CWR1 and
CWR2. CWR1 is the ratio of the number of children in the age-group 0–4 years to the
number of women in the age-group 15–49; it is an estimate of fertility in the five years
immediately preceding a census. CWR2 is the ratio of the number of children in the
age-group 5–9 years to the number of women in the age-group 20–55; it is an estimate
of fertility in the five years before that.29 Table 2 shows CWR1 and CWR2 for the two
regions over five decades using the calculations by theKerala Development Report from
census data.30 Consider the entire period spanning modern Kerala (1956–2001). In the
first 30 years of this period, the gap between Travancore-Cochin andMalabar increased
(from +25 in 1956–61 to -176 in 1981–86) because Travancore fertility declined at a
faster pace. Over the following years, the gap decreased (from -176 in 1981–86 to -52 in
1996–2001) because Malabar fertility declined at a faster pace.31 Viewed as a whole,
these data suggest that disparities in health outcomes have reduced considerably and
are almost nonexistent in recent years.
Infrastructure Disparities
By contrast, additional data on health facilities show that regional disparities in inputs
have not reduced. Figure 4 (left graph) shows government allopathic hospital beds nor-
malized by population, extending the beds data presented by Kabir–Krishnan.32 The
graph shows evidence of a roughly constant difference. The official Pai Committee
Report of 1979 had specifically recommended the creation of equal facilities in sub-
district and district hospitals across the state, particularly for beds, and the government
had responded enthusiastically.33 However, the regional trajectories for hospital beds
shows that there was in fact no trend towards reduction of disparity in publicly pro-
vided hospital beds over the following two decades. Figure 4 (right graph) shows
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FIGURE 4
GOVERNMENT HOSPITAL BEDS AND AYURVEDIC FACILITIES
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Note:Variables are per 100,000 population. Raw data are from theKerala Development Report, which compiles them from
Administrative Reports of the Health Department (Kerala) and Economic Reviews (Kerala), various years. These data were
normalized by population figures interpolated from decennial censuses.
the number of government ayurvedic institutions, normalized by population. Soon
after state-formation, Travancore-Cochin had almost 50 percent more government
Ayurvedic institutions, and the difference had widened by 2000, although Malabar
briefly overtook Travancore in the 1970s.
The data used for Figure 4 came from the Kerala government’s Health Department.
To see whether the overall trend holds for data from a different source, I turn to vil-
lage level information from the District Census Handbooks of the decennial Census
of India for 1971 and 2001.34 Table 3 presents aggregated data on allopathic hospitals
TABLE 3
VILLAGE HOSPITALS AND DISPENSARIES
1971 2001
Item Travancore-
Cochin
Malabar Dif.
(TC-M)
Travancore-
Cochin
Malabar Dif.
(TC-M)
Hospitals 2.5 0.9 1.6 5.4 3.0 2.4
Dispensaries 6.1 3.7 2.4 4.9 2.8 2.1
Hospitals and
dispensaries
8.6 4.6 4.0 10.3 5.8 4.5
Note: Data calculated from District Census Handbooks. TC and M stand for Travancore-Cochin and Malabar, respec-
tively. Data refer to number of allopathic hospitals/dispensaries per 100,000 rural population.
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and dispensaries (per 100,000 rural population) in the two regions. The regional differ-
ence for village hospitals increased between 1971 and 2001 while the regional difference
for village dispensaries decreased. It is possible that there were changes in categoriza-
tion of hospitals and dispensaries over time through upgrades or changing definitions.35
The table also provides data for hospitals and dispensaries combined; there was a small
increase in the regional difference over the three decades.36 Overall, the data presented
in Table 3 do not suggest a marked reduction in regional infrastructure differences.
Regional Disparities and the Health Production Function
The evidence presented so far suggests an intriguing pattern that is different for health
outcomes and health infrastructure inputs. The outcome disparity between the regions
seems to have narrowed over time while the input disparity has not narrowed. What
explains the puzzle of reduction in the mortality disparity and lack of reduction in the
health infrastructure disparity?
One possibility is that the indicators of health infrastructure presented in previous
sections are not the appropriate ones for operationalizing the concept of health infras-
tructure in Kerala.37 While this possibility cannot be completely ruled out, the evidence
I have presented is for indicators that are standard in the literature. For instance,
T. N. Krishnan explicitly notes that bed availability is “a good indicator of the over-
all availability of health care,” as does V. Raman Kutty.38 A second possibility is that
some factor other than health infrastructure caused the outcome disparity to narrow
over time. For instance, the land reforms movement, and the communist movement in
general—which were arguably more potent in Malabar than in Travancore-Cochin—
may have had indirect positive effects on health outcomes.39 While this possibility
cannot be ruled out, the literature explicitly argues that health infrastructure was a key
factor.40
Another possibility is that the relationship between health infrastructure and
mortality—that is, improvement in health infrastructure causing reduction in
mortality—was stronger in the case of Malabar. This could be the case if Malabar
started out with a lower level of health inputs, and the provision of improved health
infrastructure substituted for the relative absence of other health inputs there. Such a
“diminishing returns” argument could explain why the outcome disparity narrowed
over time despite the infrastructure disparity not doing so. Apoorva Shah speculates on
the possibility of a diminishing returns mechanism producing convergence in outcomes
between Malabar and Travancore.41 To my knowledge, no other scholar has advanced
this argument for these regions.42
Figure 5A is a graphical representation of the argument. The curved line is a hypo-
thetical health production function relating infrastructural input to health outcome.
Consider two regions starting out with infrastructural input levels A and B. If the
regions exhibit the same increase () in inputs over time, their new levels are A + 
and B+. The thick vertical lines represent differences in outcomes over the two peri-
ods. The concave function produces a markedly smaller disparity in outcome despite
an unchanging disparity in infrastructure. This result could hold even if, as is likely,
the health production function itself changes over time—say, an outward shift due
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FIGURE 5
REGIONAL DISPARITIES AND DIMINISHING RETURNS
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to technological and organizational improvements—if it continues to have a concave
shape. As the shape of the production function determines whether outcome dispar-
ity decreases, other shapes can yield other results. For instance, Figure 5B introduces
convexity for a portion of the production function such that the outcome disparity
now increases for specific infrastructure distributions. The analysis of health history by
Kabir and Krishnan suggests that in the second half of the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century, the relationship between health infrastructure inputs and outcomes
was indeed convex, but that it changed to a concave relationship in later decades.
Related Literature
The aforementioned argument—that diminishing returns can account for inter-
temporal change in regional disparities in Kerala—is consistent with the larger literature
on health inputs and outcomes. In exploring the impact of health facilities on health
outcomes, economists typically estimate health production functions, which can be at
the level of the individual or economy-wide. In addition to health facilities, other inputs
include environmental, socioeconomic, and lifestyle factors. Using per capita health
expenditure as a proxy for health inputs and denoting health outcomes by mortality
rates or life expectancy, the literature (national and cross-national) finds strong dimin-
ishing returns, suggesting a situation of “flat of the curve medicine.”43 Similar results
hold for the public sector component of healthcare expenditure, both for developed
and developing countries.44
Kerala in National and International Perspective
The evidence for health outcomes in Kerala when compared with India and other
countries is also consistent with a diminishing returns argument. Figure 6 (left graph)
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FIGURE 6
DIMINISHING RETURNS: INFANT MORTALITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
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Note: Figures are for infant mortality rate (number of infant deaths per 1000 live births). Data for Kerala and India are
from theKerala Development Report, compiled from the Sample Registration System. Data for Sweden, USA, andOECD
average are from the World Bank’sWorld Development Indicators.
compares the infant mortality rate (IMR) in Kerala with the rate in Sweden, the
USA, and the average for rich countries (countries belonging to the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD).45 The absolute reduction in
Swedish and American IMR has been much less than that of Kerala, thus producing
a narrowing disparity over time. The trend for the OECD average falls somewhere
between the Swedish/American and Kerala trajectories. In general, the literature
reports a falling of the dispersion of mortality rates across countries.46 Figure 6 (right
graph) compares the IMR in Kerala with the all-India figure. The difference has grad-
ually reduced over time, but given that Kerala IMR seems to be leveling off in recent
years whereas Indian IMR does not seem to be doing so, the disparity will likely reduce
rapidly in the coming years. Overall, the graph is consistent with a diminishing returns
mechanism.47 Interestingly, in this instance the ratio measure registers a steep increase
although the difference measure shows a decrease over time. While the evidence is con-
sistent with a diminishing returns mechanism, it will fall to micro-studies to show
whether this was in fact the case empirically, in the spirit of the approach advocated
by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo.48
The Kerala Regime and Regional Disparity
Does the Kerala regime factor hold explanatory value if in fact there was no reduc-
tion in input disparity between Travancore-Cochin and Malabar? The Kerala literature
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focuses on the regime’s ability to disproportionately favor the lagging Malabar
region. However, regional disparity in inputs—including disparity in publicly provided
goods—did not reduce. This suggests that the regime did not disproportionately favor
Malabar, despite its intentions or political claims to the contrary. Instead, the potency
of the regime lay in increasing development inputs throughout the state (albeit without
favoring the lagging region), and consolidating the conditions for “public action” to
effectively demand and utilize these inputs, which ultimately resulted in reduction in
outcome disparity between the regions. I sketch out this argument as follows.
Compared to the rest of India, Kerala’s policy regime was an outlier with regard
to policies focused on the social sector, particularly health and education.49 Until the
1990s, the share of health and education in total public expenditure in Kerala exceeded
the Indian average by over 10 percentage points, and this can be attributed specifically
to the post-1956 regime.50 Kerala’s social sector expenditures were also more efficiently
utilized in providing healthcare and education facilities for underserved populations.
For instance, in the early 1990s, 92 percent of births occurred in medical institutions
and 89 percent of children aged 12–23 months received vaccinations, compared with
24 percent and 70 percent for India as a whole; and in 2006, Kerala’s rate of child malnu-
trition was almost half the all-India figure.51 Further, the greater public fiscal and policy
commitment to the social sector went alongside greater public awareness and demand—
described as “public action” in the Kerala context—which led to better utilization as
well as improved equity.52 Kerala’s success in improving health outcomes was one of
five worldwide cases to be singled out in a seminal 1985 report commissioned by the
Rockefeller Foundation, Good Health at Low Cost.
Especially at the time, other regimes—in other parts of India and elsewhere—were
less able to commit and implement healthcare and education policies, or consolidate
the conditions for public action. Accompanying these developments was a reduction in
regional disparities, likely through a diminishing returns mechanism. Thus, while the
impact of the Kerala regime on overall development outcomes was direct, its impact on
regional outcome disparity was indirect. It is even possible that the impact on outcome
disparity was a largely unintended consequence of the working of the regime, despite
political claims and intentions to directly favor Malabar (in terms of development
inputs) over Travancore-Cochin.
Conclusion
This study has explored the comparative health trajectories of Malabar and Travancore-
Cochin. To better explore change in regional disparity over time, and the possible
association with the Kerala regime, I distinguished between regional disparity in health
infrastructure and health outcomes. I showed that different convergence measures—
ratio versus difference—can yield different conclusions, and argued that the difference
measure is more meaningful for understanding the developing world. Whereas the dis-
tinction is a technical one, it produces a significantly different implication regarding
regional disparity, and in Kerala’s case, the role of political and policy regimes as well.
Therefore, the analysis presented here has larger methodological implications for the
study of time trajectories of regional disparity.
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The re-evaluation of the evidence for disparity yielded the puzzle of reducing out-
come disparity without reducing infrastructure disparity. I argued that the puzzle is
easily explained if the production function shows diminishing returns, and that this is
in fact quite plausible. However, for lack of adequate data I did not establish conclu-
sively that Kerala’s regions actually do conform to a diminishing returns production
function. More research is needed on this issue, both for Kerala and other states of
India.
However, the fact that infrastructure disparity did not reduce in the manner that the
extant literature has described, suggests the need for reappraising the role of Kerala’s
social democratic regime, which has been celebrated, among other things, for reducing
infrastructure disparity. I have suggested that the success of Kerala’s regime lay not
in pro-actively promoting healthcare in Malabar over Travancore-Cochin, but rather in
promoting healthcare equally across both regions in a more potent manner than regimes
in other parts of India andmuch of the developing world. In the presence of diminishing
returns, the potency of such a keen—but largely region-neutral—development policy
regime is a plausible explanation for Kerala’s impressive human development outcomes.
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Appendix: Health Outcomes in the Kabir–Krishnan Study
Figure 1 plots the data used by Kabir–Krishnan for two health outcomes (general mor-
tality and infant mortality) and shows a dramatic reduction in the mortality gap in the
two regions over time. However, only a part of the mortality data presented by Kabir–
Krishnan comes from the Sample Registration System (SRS), which is generally held to
be the most reliable data source for the 1970s and 1980s. For the period prior to the
1970s, the mortality estimates are based on census data, and these estimates are sensi-
tive to age misreporting and assumptions about infant and child mortality, and were not
fully comprehensive in population coverage.53 A second alternative data source is the
Civil Registration System (CRS), the official mechanism of collecting data on all births
and deaths sanctioned by the Registration of Births and Deaths Act of 1969. However,
CRS mortality numbers are very different from the SRS mortality estimates, especially
prior to the 1990s, and the gap varies over time, as shown in Figure 7. For these reasons,
the only reliable data source for mortality data for the 1970s and 1980s is the SRS.
Unfortunately, SRS mortality data for Kerala are available only from the 1970s.
Further, the SRS is geared towards state-level data, so it does not provide data for
districts or regions (Malabar and Travancore-Cochin) on an annual basis. Thus, of the
regional mortality data presented byKabir–Krishnan and plotted in Figure 1, only three
observations are reliable: those based on SRS for the years 1977, 1983, and 1987. For
general mortality, the difference between the regions in 1977 was only 1.8 deaths per
thousand population, and this gap became 0 over the ensuing ten years. While these
are more credible numbers, and they show a reduction and elimination of the gap, the
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FIGURE 7
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN DATA FROM CIVIL AND SAMPLE REGISTRATION SYSTEMS FOR KERALA
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Source: Data for Kerala. Sample Registration System (SRS) data from the Kerala Development Report; Civil Registration
System (SRS) data from Administrative Reports of the Health Department.
difference of 1.5 in 1977 was not much to begin with. This may be because much of
the gap—assuming that one existed when the Kerala regime began in 1957—had been
closed by 1977, but no reliable regional mortality estimates exist prior to 1977 to val-
idate that speculation.54 With regard to infant mortality, Kabir–Krishnan present data
only for 1983 and 1987. These two data points do show a huge reduction in the gap;
over the space of four years, Travancore-Cochin reduced infant mortality by five deaths
per 1000 births, while Malabar reduced it by 18 deaths per 1000 births. In the case of
Malabar, such a large reduction—from 46 to 28, amounting to as much as 40 percent—
in the space of only four years suggests that even these data are likely to be faulty.
In short, the mortality data provided by Kabir-Krishnan are inadequate in showing
that a considerable regional health outcome gap existed in 1956, or that it reduced
subsequently.
